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INTRODUCTION
A much debated question is whether firms in countries with more stringent environmental policies shift production to countries with less stringent environmental policies. Such countries are often referred to as pollution havens. Yet, so far, the evidence on pollution haven effects has been at best mixed and such effects remain highly contentious in debates about environment, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) . One of the reasons for the intensity of the debates is that environmental policy is often seen as a latent trade policy, especially now tariffs and quotas are gradually phased out with each round of multilateral trade negotiations.
Most empirical work on pollution havens has been directed on outsourcing and net imports to the U.S.
(e.g., Becker and Henderson, 2000; List and Co, 2000; Keller and Levinson, 2002; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Javorcik and Wei, 2004; Kahn and Yoshino, 2004; Ederington et al., 2004) . Typically, exogenous abatement costs or pollution levels are used as proxies for environmental policy but these studies typically find statistically insignificant effects on trade flows or FDI and thus find no evidence of pollution haven effects (also Brunnermeier and Levinson, 2004; Copeland and Taylor, 2004) . However, if environmental policy is instrumented, more substantial effects of U.S. abatement costs are found on U.S.
inward FDI (Fredriksson et al., 2003) and on net imports into the U.S. (Ederington and Minier, 2003) .
None of these studies investigate the impact of environmental policy in a multi-country setting. Moreover, our data shows that the U.S. environmental policy has become less stringent over time and that it is less stringent than the average Western European country, which implies that the U.S. itself could be a pollution haven. The Netherlands however ranks 8 th in the world for our measure of environmental policy. 1 However, an innovative recent study does find robust evidence for substantial pollution haven effects at a sector level (Kellenberg, 2009) . This cross-country study uses a new dataset on environmental policy * We are grateful for detailed comments from our editor, Peter Egger, and an anonymous referee and also for helpful discussions with Beata Javorcik and Tony Venables. 1 The top-ten ranking for 2005 is Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Norway, The Netherlands, Japan and Luxembourg. The U.S. ranks 20 th together with Taiwan and just above Tunisia.
stringency and enforcement based on questionnaires in many countries and that it allows for the endogenous determination of income and strategic environment and trade policies. To identify pollution haven effects, it is assumed that individual countries strategically compete with other countries when setting stringency and enforcement of environmental policies. In contrast to the majority of previous empirical studies but in line with earlier evidence given by Ederington et al. (2005) , this study finds substantial pollution haven effects for U.S. multinational firms in foreign countries in those industries that are footloose such as electrical equipment, appliances and components and machinery but not for more traditional capital-intensive, pollution-intensive industries such as mining and utilities with high fixed costs in production and high trade costs. The most capital-intensive industries are thus not necessarily the most likely industries to react to changes in environmental policy.
Our prime objective is to reconsider the results of Kellenberg (2009) by testing for a different hypothesis.
We put forward the idea that in some sectors a reputation for sustainable management and corporate social responsibility (CSR) may be more important than avoiding stringent and strictly enforced environmental policy, especially for those sectors which are relatively footloose. In many developed countries translating the ideas of the triple bottom line, also known as 'people, profit, and planet', and 'cradle to grave' concepts into real business practice and CSR are gaining ground (Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2011) . Indeed, many firms find it important for their reputation to report in their annual account what they have done about the triple bottom line and want to be seen to be doing something about these issues. Such firms thus want to minimize their ecological footprint, have a reciprocal social structure and wish to comply with the Global Reporting Initiative (e.g., Willis, 2003; Herzig and Schaltegger, 2006) . Such firms might undertake FDI in countries with stricter and better enforced environmental standards to avoid having to deal with issues such as how to deal with waste products.
Many of these firms already send waste products to countries such as India or China to be processed. This argument will turn out to be especially relevant for relatively footloose industries such as machines, electronics and automotive, and ICT and communication. However, other industries such as refineries with relatively high fixed costs cannot so easily take care of their waste, which tends to end up in the soil.
The public, shareholders, etc. only find out about this afterwards.
We thus put forward our alternative hypothesis that firms in traditional capital-intensive, pollutionintensive industries with high setup and trade costs shy away from countries with stringent and strictly enforced environmental policies and thus display pollution haven effects whilst relatively footloose, CSRminded industries concerned with the triple bottom line and their green reputation are attracted to such countries. We are thus putting up the pollution haven hypothesis against the green haven hypothesis.
We examine the robustness of the results obtained by Kellenberg (2009) to a more comprehensive FDI data set with country dummies rather than regional dummies and with an alternative set of instruments for the regulation stringency and enforcement of environmental policy. We use data on Dutch outward FDI from the central bank of The Netherlands, which does not contain any gaps (in contrast to public data which does have gaps for confidentiality reasons) and allows for more sectors, more countries and more years. We make use of the data of regulation and enforcement of environmental policy derived from the questionnaires reported in the Global Competitiveness Reports (GCR) of the World Economic Forum and used for the first time by Kellenberg (2009) . Table 1 plots enforcement against stringency of environmental policy for the countries in our dataset. This suggests that on average enforcement is less strong than stringency of environmental policy in a given country. This is why we follow Kellenberg (2009) and allow for both enforcement and stringency of policy when testing for pollution haven and green haven effects.
FIGURE 1 Enforcement and regulation of environmental policy
Our empirical evidence suggests that countries with a more stringent and better enforced environmental policy deter FDI going to the more traditional capital-intensive, pollution-intensive industries such as natural resources extraction and refining, and utilities. We also find statistically significant pollution haven effects for agriculture and food processing, beverages and tobacco. We find that countries with a more stringent and better enforced environmental policy attract FDI to the sectors machines, electrical and automotive industries. We interpret these as green haven effects: Dutch firms in these sectors preferring for reasons of a good reputation for the triple bottom line, people profit and planet, CSR and sustainable governance to locate in those countries where environmental policy is more stringent and better enforced. Kellenberg (2009) uses public data on US outward FDI from the BEA whilst we use data on Dutch outward FDI. His BEA dataset covers only 5 years, 9 sectors and 50 countries whilst our dataset on Dutch outward FDI covers 7 years and 12 sectors for 188 countries. Furthermore, our dataset has comprehensive coverage and does not contain any gaps for confidentiality reasons. Our econometrics allows for the more detailed country fixed effects than regional fixed effects. Our analysis is also related to that of Wagner Section 2 discusses in some detail our FDI dataset and the data for regulation stringency and enforcement of environmental policy that we use. Section 3 offers a first shot at estimating the effects of environmental policy on aggregate FDI. It finds no evidence of pollution haven or green haven effects at the aggregate level. Section 4 presents the econometric specification of our tests for pollution havens and green havens at the sector level where we do find statistically significant effects. Section 5 discusses our instruments for regulation stringency and enforcement of environmental policy. Section 6 presents our main results for sectoral pollution haven and green haven effects at the sector level. Section 7 concludes.
FDI AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DATA
We test our hypotheses with outward FDI data on investments done by multinationals in as many countries as possible. Since available FDI data sets either have large gaps in them for reasons of confidentiality, we use a unique dataset on outward FDI from the Netherlands collected by De Nederlandsche Bank. This dataset benefits from all firms being legally required to report their currentaccount transactions, including foreign investment flows and positions collected via banks, stating the balance sheet current Euro value of FDI stocks and the value of new investment flows. In contrast, publicly available BEA data for US outward FDI is based on five-yearly censuses, but relies on surveys and interpolation for years in between (Mataloni, 1995 There is a big variation in average regulation enforcement of environmental policy across countries, with
Western Europe having the heaviest regulation and South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa having the least regulation. The United States is relatively less stringent and could therefore be attractive for polluting Western European firms. Since the source country for our dataset of FDI has a more stringent and better enforced environmental policies (with score of 34.0 and 34.7 in 2005) than the potential destination countries in our sample, one might think that firms in the home country are either on the lookout for countries with a more lax environmental policy (pollution havens) or avoid countries that put their stakeholders to shame from a green perspective. Since most of the outward FDI has been going to Western Europe despite the strictly enforced environmental regulation, we must capture in our empirical work all the other factors that affect outward FDI by allowing for time fixed effects, sector fixed effects and country fixed effects as well as the most relevant explanatory variables. Table 2 indicates that most of Dutch outward FDI has come from natural resources extraction and refining, which has shown a spectacular growth in FDI and some slackening of average regulation enforcement of environmental policies in destination countries. A similar trend can be seen for the retail sector. Interestingly, a sector such as machines, electronics and automotive has also seen a rapid growth in FDI but a tightening of regulation enforcement. To a lesser extent, this is true for the sector chemicals, rubber and plastics as well. Construction has almost doubled its FDI with hardly a change in regulation enforcement. The average environmental protection that each sector faces is much smaller than regulation and enforcement at home.
Because of the variation of environmental protection and FDI across sectors and countries it is an empirical matter to find out what, if any, the effect is of environmental protection on FDI. the context of FDI). We explain the estimation method and the corresponding LM test statistics in more detail in the appendix. The normal determinants of FDI turn up significantly: the size of the market as measured by the population size and GDP per capita has a positive effect on FDI. In column b we change the unit of observation from a country-year to a sector-country-year. The negative effect of distance now becomes significant (which is the gravity effect), surrounding market potential has a negative effect on FDI, and the share of government spending in GDP in the destination country appears to deter FDI. Other variables such as the spatial lag or institutions are statistically insignificant. Finally, in the last column we include not only year, but also country and sector fixed effects. Following the method of Cameron et al.
(2011), we also cluster the standard errors on years, countries and sectors to allow for unobserved correlation of the errors at these non-nested levels. The result is that no variables are significant anymore.
However, the main insight we obtain from table 3 is that enforcement interacted with regulation of environmental policy does not have any statistically significant effect on FDI. This is in line with previous empirical studies which also have trouble finding a significant and robust effect of environmental policy on FDI. Since we did not find significant average effects of regulation and enforcement of environmental policy, we will investigate whether we can establish pollution haven effects at the sector level. Before we do this, we discuss our econometric specification and our choice of instruments for regulation and enforcement of environmental policy.
TESTING FOR POLLUTION HAVENS AND GREEN HAVENS AT SECTOR LEVEL
Given that there is no empirical support for pollution haven or green haven effects at the aggregate level, we decided to test for them at the sector level. For this purpose, we use the index i to denote the country of destination for the FDI, the index j to denote the sector receiving the FDI in the destination country, and the index t to denote the year. The variable we are trying to explain is the log of FDI from the Netherlands to sector j of destination country i in year t, and denote this by ln( ) ijt FDI . Our main interest is in the so-called environmental policy index in the destination country, it EPI . To test for pollution haven and green haven effects, we specify the following econometric model:
where i  and jt  denote, respectively, the country fixed effect and the sector-year fixed effects, j going to sector j is deterred by a less stringent and less strictly enforced environmental policy in the destination country. This is the green haven effect.
INSTRUMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
To instrument the environmental policy index in a regression of US multinational affiliate activity abroad, Kellenberg (2009) uses variables related to agriculture in addition to survey data on public schools, infrastructure and crime, which are each GDP-weighted averages of other countries within the same large region. The idea is that, for example, crime and land per agricultural worker in Germany (which is a large share of European GDP) influences Austrian environmental standards through regional strategic policy competition, but does not affect US multinational affiliate sales in manufacturing in Austria directly.
However, if this mechanism holds, then a policy change in Germany that affects a policy change in German and Austrian environmental standards is likely to affect MNE investment in both countries also. Levinson and Taylor (2008) alternatively examine the effect of pollution abatement costs for 130 sectors in US states on net imports from Canada and Mexico. To instrument these costs, they assume that no sector is large enough on its own to affect state regulation. The first sector-year level instrument for the industry's demand of pollution equals the total of each state's total current emission of pollutants by other sectors, summed across states with weights according to the sector's beginning of period value added share. The second instrument for industry pollution supply (regulation) sums the current income per capita of all states weighted by the sector's value added share in each state. Karp (2011) questions this strategy because shocks to a collection of sectors will affect aggregate abatement costs directly such that the instrument is still correlated with the error term. Because some countries are large within Kellenberg's regions, a similar critique applies to those instruments as well.
We take a different strategy. Where Kellenberg (2009) includes year and region fixed effects and Levinson and Taylor (2008) industry and year fixed effects, we are able to include country fixed effects and sector-year fixed effects. The sector-specific influence of destination-country environmental policy on FDI is therefore net of shocks that are specific to each sector in a particular year, but common to all the sector's destination countries, such as unobserved productivity or demand shocks that may affect the sector's demand for pollution. These also absorb global shocks that affect all sectors and countries equally, and country fixed effects absorb country characteristics that do not change between 1999 and 2005, which may include a significant share of a country's demand for environmental protection. We therefore identify the main effect through time variation in sectoral FDI and environmental policy at the country level. The inclusion of this large set of fixed effects implies that it is much less likely that the error term in our regressions for outward FDI is correlated with environmental policy.
Nevertheless, to the extent that regulation changes because of promised investment by foreign MNEs through policy competition, there may still be some correlation left. As instruments we use the predetermined demand for environmental protection, because it is determined by taste and pollution (Copeland and Taylor, 2003, chapter 2 Stringent environmental policy is most likely a result of past rather than current pollution levels. As countries develop, they become both dirtier and wealthier and people will start to demand a cleaner environment. Since changing regulation takes time, we suspect that lagged levels of pollution have more predictive power for current regulation than current pollution, apart from the obvious endogeneity of current pollution levels. We proxy past pollution with CO2 emissions in kilograms per GDP, since good data exists for a long time period. The data confirms that a lag of 10 years has more predictive power for current regulation and enforcement than shorter lags.
EVIDENCE FOR POLLUTION AND GREEN HAVEN EFFECTS AT THE SECTOR LEVEL
Using these instruments for regulation and enforcement of environmental policy , table 4 658 Clustered (by country, sector and year) standard errors in parentheses, except in column (b) where standard errors are clustered on countries and years. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include country and sector-year effects, except column (b) which includes country and year effects.
can substitute for enforcement of environmental legislation. Unfortunately, the measure of the net present value of protected areas changes too little over time to yield significant results. However, the instruments still yield a combined F-test of 23.43, which implies that they jointly predict EPI very well. 9 In the second stage (regression (c)), we allow the predicted values of log EPI to have sector-specific effects on sectorlevel FDI. The result is only marginally less precisely estimated, and the robust Hansen overidentification test does not reject that the instruments are uncorrelated with the second stage error term.
As before, we cluster the standard errors on countries, years and sectors, implying that the estimates are robust to correlated shocks within countries, within years and within sectors.
The largest effects are in the sectors agriculture, food processing, natural resources, and utilities. Kellenberg (2009) also finds a negative and significant effect for the food sector, but insignificant effects for mining, utilities, and primary metals, which could be do to the fact that his dataset is smaller and more selective, and/or weakness of the instruments.
However, we also find that machines and electronics and transportation & communication are attracted to higher environmental standards. These sectors thus display green haven effects. Kellenberg (2009) also finds a positive, although insignificant, effect for computers and electronics.
This may make sense if computer and electronics rely more on clean environments (or even sterile in the case of chip making) as an input in production (such as clean water). In the case of transportation it could be that most of their investment has to be as clean as in the home country. Trucks for example may need to be allowed on the road in both the destination and the origin country.
As far as robustness is concerned, we have re-estimated the equations separating rubber from chemicals but this did not make a difference. Separating base metals from natural resources also made no difference.
Taking logs of trade or FDI usually leads to the problem that zero observations are dropped from the sample, possibly causing sample selection bias. However, our data has enough detail and coverage that FDI is never zero or missing for observations where we observe stringency and enforcement, so a Heckman two-step estimator is not required. Sample selection bias could still be introduced if the sample of countries that was surveyed in the GCR is not random, which is similar to 'censoring'. The solution to this problem (apart from extending the survey) is to instrument the environmental policy index (Wooldridge, 2002) , which is what we have done in table 4.
CONCLUSION
The idea that dirty industries migrate to parts of the world with less stringent and strictly enforced environmental policies is known as the pollution haven hypothesis. We pit against this the green haven hypothesis, which may be relevant for firms in home countries that already have a tough environmental policy. For them starting operations in parts of the world which do not take the environment very serious may make bad sense from a CSR business perspective. Unfortunately, there has been a paucity of robust empirical evidence for pollution haven effects in the literature and there have been no tests of the green haven hypothesis. Using a comprehensive and exhaustive dataset for outward FDI from the Netherlands and data on the regulation stringency and enforcement of environmental policy collected in various Global Competitiveness Reports for the World Economic Reform, we do not find in our cross-country estimates any significant pollution haven or indeed green haven effects at the aggregate level.
However, we do find different pollution haven and green haven effects for outward FDI at the sector level. Our empirical evidence suggests that in the sectors natural resources extraction and refining, construction, retail, food processing, beverages and tobacco, and utilities a more stringent environmental policy in the host country significantly deters FDI. What is important for these pollution haven effects is not only regulation but also enforcement of environmental policy. In contrast to earlier results (Kellenberg, 2009) , it is not only footloose industries that display pollution haven effects, but also the traditional pollution-intensive industries such as refineries. In fact, for the sectors machines, electronics and automotive and transportation and communication a more stringent environmental policy attracts more FDI. This suggests that Dutch multinational firms in these latter sectors are deterred from investing in countries with bad environmental policy as this may hurt their reputation for sustainable management, and attracted to places with strict and strictly enforced environmental standards. This thus establishes green haven effects for these relatively footloose, CSR-minded sectors.
Of course, our evidence for green havens is only tentative. To establish that the demarcation between green havens and pollution havens really occurs along industry lines rather that footloose technologies and other less footloose technologies with high fixed costs are used in different plants in the same industry, more work is needed. This would require detailed FDI data at the plant level, which we unfortunately do not have at our disposal. Alternatively, our analysis could be backed up with in-depth case studies in future work to establish whether the demarcation occurs across industry or plant lines. (Table) in Global Competitiveness Report: 2000: 12.06 & 12.12; 2001 : 11.06 & 11.12: 2002 2003: 11.05 & 11.10; 2004: 10.01 & 10.02; 2005: 9 
